





































































































































Year 200120020032004 2005 2006 2007 2008 20092010
The　Number　of　Consolidatedrubsidiaries 329 315319339 368519550537 542498
ToshibaThe　Number　of　Equity－Method
`fHliates 35 52 64 71 111 153 1939200 202
Total 364367383410 479672 743 736 742 700
The　Number　of　Consolidated
rubsidiaries 1066 1112956985 932934 910943900913
HitachiThe　Number　of　Equity－Method
`f丑liates 108 119165167158165171166157 164








































































































































































































Sales Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average
Dlgital　Products32．85％ 35．14％36．90％ 36．57％35．70％ 34．28％35．24％
Electronic　Devices20．98％ 20．65％20．19％ 21．60％21．03％ 18．41％ 20．48％
ToshibaSoclal　Infrastructure28．02％27．89％ 27．38％26．95％ 29．26％ 33．29％ 28．80％
Home　ApPllances10．42％10．44％ 10．00％ 9．76％9．37％ 9．37％ 9．89％
Other 7．73％ 5．67％ 5．52％ 5．11％ 4．65％ 4．64％ 5．59％
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008Average
Informetion＆Telecom－
高浮獅奄モ≠狽奄盾氏@Systems 22．57％ 21．27％21．45％ 20．96％21．71％ 22．81％ 21．79％
Electronic　Devices12．80％12．38％ 10．94％10．91％ 10．17％ 10．12％1．22％
Power＆Industrlal　Sys・
狽?高
22．41％2358％25．48％ 25．62％28．05％ 29．10％ 25．71％
HitachiDigital　Media＆Con－
唐浮高?秩@Products 11．96％ 12．00％11．86％ 12．77％11．83％ 11．09％ 11．92％
High　Functional　Materi－
≠撃刀浮bomonents 12．65％ 14．10％14．54％ 15．21％14．74％ 13．69％ 14．15％
Logistics，　Services＆
nthers 12．25％ 11．70％11．03％ 10．29％10．00％ 8．58％10．81％
Flnancial　Services5．37％． 4．97％ 4．70％ 4．24％ 3．50％ 3．62％ 4．40％
Operating
@Proflt Year 2003 20042005 20062007 2008 Average
Dlgital　Products一13．67％ 4．69％ 8．64％ 6．05％ 6．30％一5．68％ 1．06％
Electronic　Devices67．19％59．73％ 51．08％ 45．94％ 31．01％一129．19％2096％
ToshibaSocial　Infrastructure33．67％ 31．35％ 31．71％37．12％ 54．92％ 45．27％ 39．01％
Home　ApPllances1．99％ 一2．15％ 1．12％ 3．71％ 1．64％一10．85％一〇．76％
Other 10．82％ 6．37％ 7．44％ 7．18％ 6．14％ 0．21％ 6．36％
2003 2004 2005 20062007 2008 Average
Informetion＆Telecom－
高浮獅奄モ≠狽奄盾氏@Systems 33．15％ 21．48％25．94％ 23．19％29．54％ 96．16％ 38．24％
Electronic　Devices14．42％11．73％ 6．26％ 17．58％ 13．75％ 14．87％13．10％
Power＆Industrlal　Sys－
狽?高
16．09％23．35％ 28．35％ 13．98％ 35．23％ 13．20％ 21．70％
HitachiDigital　Media＆Con・
唐浮高?秩@Products 3．30％ 2．76％一1096％一22．46％ 一27．96％ 一57．47％一18．80％
High　Functional　Materi－
≠撃刀浮bomonents 22．17％ 27．74％33．71％ 50．88％ 35．88％ 15．12％ 30．92％
Logistics，　Services＆
nthers 0．25％ 3．11％ 5．98％ 7．78％ 7．09％ 12．56％ 6．13％











??垂?獅р奄狽浮窒 Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008Average
Dlgital　Products19．08％ 10．66％ 12．18％ 8．04％7．80％ 9．34％ 11．18％
Electronic　Devices53．47％ 69．87％ 66．00％ 71．67％ 70．53％ 58．44％65．00％
ToshibaSoclal　Infrastructure10．84％10．69％ 12．15％12．58％ 13．99％21．26％ 13．58％
Home　ApPllances7．58％ 6．42％ 7．55％ 5．34％ 4．96％ 5．03％6．15％
Other 9．03％ 2．36％ 2．12％ 2．37％ 2．71％ 5．93％ 4．09％
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008Average
Informetion＆Telecom－
高浮獅奄モ≠狽奄盾氏@Systems 9．77％ 10．46％ 12．53％ 14．15％ 10．10％ 8．01％ 10．84％
Electronic　Devices4．71％ 4．78％ 3．64％3．15％ 2．58％ 3．77％ 3．77％
Power＆Industrlal　Sys－
狽?高 8．53％ 999％ 10．86％ 13．81％ 15．90％21．66％ 13．46％
HitachiDigital　Media＆Con－
唐浮高?秩@Products 3．80％ 3．90％ 3．92％ 7．56％ 8．94％ 5．32％ 5．57％
High　Functional　Materi－
≠撃刀浮bomonents 7．43％ 7．67％ 8．60％ 8．35％ 10．40％ 12．85％9．22％
Logistics，　Services＆
nthers 3．48％ 3．16％ 2．45％ 2．57％ 3．76％ 3．87％ 322％
Flnancial　Services62．26％ 60．04％ 58．01％50．42％ 48．31％ 44．53％53．93％
Total　asset／employee Year 2003 20042005 2006 2007 2008Average
Dlgital　Products20．82 22．56 24．50 27．21 26．40 20．00 23．58
Electronic　Devices35．68 38．3039．78 41．58 44．12 40．88 40．06
ToshibaSocial　Infrastructure42．91 27．49 27．74 35．42 33．36 32．73 33．27
Home　ApPllances20．16 17．52 16．29 16．15 15．64 14．29 16．68
Other 15．71 56．20 47．16 38．91 30．99 26．87 35．97
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008Average
Informetion＆Telecom－
高浮獅奄モ≠狽奄盾氏@Systems 19．61 19．60 20．41 20．2319．07 17．10 1934
Electronic　Devices35．80 32．32 31．51 29．14 29．7823．49層 30．34
Power＆Industrlal　Sys－
狽?高 28．67 27．87 28．11 28．16 31．75 29．09 28．94
HitachiDigital　Media＆Con－
唐浮高?秩@Products 24．87 2298 26．87 26．79 24．87 19．1824．26
High　Functional　Materi－
≠撃刀浮bomonents 24．43 23．6424．94 28．13 29．9624．93 26．00
Logistics，　Services＆
nthers 35．33 32．48 33．65 35．8832． 8 34．40 34．27
Flnancial　Services496．37 528．26 547．50 623．93582．09 585．29 560．57
Note　：The　table　includes　intersegment　sales　and　does　not　consider‘‘eliminations”
Source：Toshiba　and　Hitachi，　Yuha－・shoken－holeokusho，　various　years
　　When　comparing　Toshiba　and　Hitachi，　the　key　difference　that　emerges　is　that，　while　Toshiba
was　increasing　its　commitment　to　two　business　segments，　electronics　devices　and　the　social　infras－
tructure，　Hitachi　reflected　less　disparity　within　its　manufacturing　segments　in　terms　of　perfor－
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mance　and　investment，　although　the　information＆telecommunication　system　segment　could　be
considered　as　the　traditional　financial　performance　driver　within　its　business　structure．　To　verify
the　factors　that　produced　these　results　over　the　period，　one　needs　to　explore　their　respective　cor－
porate　strategles．
V，　Different　Approaches　Taken　to　Corporate　Reform
1．　Toshiba　Reorganization：‘‘Focusing　and　Selecting”
　　Entering　into　the　new　century，　both　firms　recognized　the　need　for　action　and　took　on　corporate
reform　in　earnest．　Toshiba　CEO　Taizo　Nishimuro（tenure：1996－2000）1aunched　a　thorough
process　of　corporate　reform，　under　a　corporate　policy　and　plan　that　called　for‘‘Focusing　and　Select－
ing”on　the　basis　of　pro且tabilityxvi．　New　CEO　Tadashi　Okamura（tenure：2000－2005）then　succeed－
ed　Nishimuro’s　basic　reform　policy　with　some　modi且cation，　introducing　a　new　mid－term　plan　called
‘‘O1Action　Plan，”which　led　the　corporate　reform　from　year　20000nwards．
　　In　response　to　the　bursting　of　the　IT　bubble，　Okamura　redefined　the　areas　of　business　as　either
（1）rapid　growth　or（2）consistent　growth．　He　accomplished　this　by　shifting　away　from　a　previous
overemphasis　on　IT　business　to　a　fnore　balanced　investment　in　both　rapid　and　consistent　growth
business　groups．　The　rapid　growth　business　included　digital　media，　mobiles，　semiconductors，
LCDs，　solutions　and　platforms，　and　consistent　growth　came　from　social　infrastructure，　medical
systems，　power　systems　and　home　appliancesxvii．　While　spinning　ofF且ve　divisions　in　response　to　the
national　conlmercial　law　reform，　some　products　such　as　NAND　memories　and　medical　equipment
grew　and　contributed　to　the　growthxviii．
　　His　successor，　Atsutoshi　Nishida（tenure：2005－2009）went　a　step　further　by　introducing　a
strategy　of　two　core　business　fields，　To　strategically　allocate　its　resources，　Toshiba　defined　its　core
business　as（1）semiconductors，　used　to　attain　high　yet　unstable　profits，　and（2）the　nuclear　power
business，　to　generate　stable，　long－term　profits．　The　intention　was　to　attain　stable　pro且tability　as　a
whole　for　the　periodxix．　The　investment　in　electric　devices，　especially　NAND　memory，　and　the　ac－
quisition　of　nuclear　business，　Westinghouse　Electric　Company　in　2006，　are　representative　of　each．
Through　these　corporate　reforms，　business　and　profitablllty　growth　progressed　in　the　2000s，　up
until　the　Lehman　Shock　in　2008．　The　investment　trajectory　analysis　presents　the　strategy　for　the
2000s　where　investment　in　facilities　ratio　increase　from　active　capital　investment　while　the　other
two　ratios　decrease　arising　from　the　virtuous　cycle　of　investment　and　performance．
2．且itachi　Reorganization：‘‘Conglomerate　Premium”
　　Meanwhile　Hitachi’s　corporate　strategy　during　the　2000s　was　championed　by　Etsuhiko　Shoyama
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（tenure：1999－2006）and　Kazuo　Furukawa（tenure：2006－2009）．Hitachi　had　started　reforming　it－
self　in　1999　with　a　core　concept，　the‘‘i．e．（information＆electronics）social　system　corporation”ax，
CEO　Shoyama　introduced　Hitachi　Plan　I＆II，　the　first　time　for　the　firm　to　publically　announce　such
plansxxi．　Although　a　similar　emphasis　was　placed　on　the　importance　of　the　information＆electronics
business，　the　Hitachi　plans　pursued　concepts　different　from　that　of　Toshiba，　such　as　synergy，　con－
glomerate　premium，　business　start－ups，　strength　of　technologyxxii，　and　bottom－up　revivalxxiii．
　　Hitachi　Plan　I　aimed　at“increasing　7．5％in　ROE　by　2003　Mar　through　raising　the　level　of　IT
related　business　sales　to　70％and　withdrawing　from　unprofitable　businessxxiv．”In　2003，　Hitachi
Plan　II　was　announced　with　higher　objectives，　including　8％ROE　and　withdrawing　from　20％of　its
business　by　March　2005．　Some　representative　actions　during　the　period　include　the　establishment
of　Elpida　Memory（NEC　Hitachi　Memory），through　a　merger　of　its　DRAM　business　with　NEC　in
1999，the　acquisition　of　HDD　business　from　IBM，　and　the　establishment　of　Renesas　Technology
with　Mitsubishi　Electric　in　2003．　Although　these　plans　were　not　fully　completed，　they　did　provide
opportunities　for　the　reform　of　the　electric／electronics　industry　in　some　business丘elds．
　　After　failing　to　achieve　the　goal　of　Hitachi　Plan　II，　another　policy　was　launched　in　2006，　with　a
central　theme　of‘‘collaborative　creation　and　profits”and　a　rigorous　focus　on　a　market－
orientationxxv．　Searching　to　cooperate　with　othersxxvi，　Hitachi　placed　emphasis　on　the　social　infras－
tructure　business　by　increasing　its　related　capital　investment，　while　it　also　invested　in　digital　media
＆consulner　products，　such　as　flat　panel　televisions．　This　saw　Hitachi　increase　its　performance　in
the　social　infrastructure　business，　by　investing，　for　example，　in　high－speed　rail　in　the　UK　and　fossil
fuel　power　plants　in　other　EU　countries．　In　the　end，　digital　media＆consumer　products　did　not
recover，　ultimately　holding　back　the　entire　performance　of　Hitachi．　These　corporate　reforms　con－
tributed　to　business　growth　in　the　2000s，　again　up　until　the　Lehman　Shock　in　2008．　The　investment
trajectory　analysis　in　the　2000s　reveals　decreases　in　two　investment　ratios（R＆D　and　Marketing　et
al），more　due　to　the　fact　that　total　revenue　kept　increasing　while　the　two　were　maintained　at　con・
stant　levels　of　investment，　with　the　third　category　of　investment　keeping　pace　with　revenue　growth
to　a　certain　degree．　Unlike　the　case　for　Toshiba，　however，　the　overall　relation　of　investment　and
performance　reflects　a　less　positive　outcome．
3．　“Selecting　and　Focusing”or‘‘Focusing　without　Selecting”
　　Distinct　characteristics　are　revealed　when　one　considers　the　corporate　strategies　and　representa－
tive　behaviors　of　both丘rms．　Both　firms　were　faced　with　similar　motivations，　which　included　the
五nancial　environment，　IT　business　challenges　and　a　necessity　for　corporate　reform　through　the　pur－
suit　of　selecting　and　focusing　strategies．　Toshiba　has　more　strictly　implemented　its　selecting　and
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focusing　strategy，　in　terms　of　profitability，　and　established　a　virtuous　cycle　between　investment　and
performance．　On　the　other　hand，　Hitachi　has　tried　to　execute　its‘‘selecting　and　focusing”strategy
with　consideration　of　its　synergies　and　strengths　of　technology，　and　this　resulted　with　less　selective
focusing．　The　point　of　divergence　is　not　so　much　in　the‘‘what”each　was　doing　but　more　in　the
“how”，　at　least　in　terms　of　their　approaches　to‘‘selecting　and　focusing”．
Vl．　Conclusion
　　Using　the　case　of　Toshiba　and　Hitachi，　this　article　has　sought　to　explore　and　define　the　differ－
ences　and　identify　the　turning　point　of　divergence　between　two　signi且cant　Japanese　manufacturing
且rms．　This　analysis　informs　on　when　and　how　firms　within　the　same　industrial　grouping　can
differentiate　due　to　courses　take且in　their　investment　strategies　and　corporate　responses．
　　This　article　proposes　2003　as　the　turning　point　of　differentiation　between　Toshiba　and
Hitachi’副i．　Up　until　2003，　both　generally　took　quite　similar　trajectories　in　spite　of　differences　in
their　respective　investment　patterns．　However，　subsequent　to　2003，　Toshiba　recovered　to　achieve　a
positive　net　income　margin　while　its　investment　ratio，　although　monetarily　lower，　was　at　a　relative－
ly　higher　rate．　Conversely，　Hitachi　struggled　to　return　to　pro且tability，　although　it　has　recently　reco－
vered　to　a　certain　extent．
　　Beyond　the　trajectories，　the　study　then　delves　deeper　to　identify　differences　in　management　poli－
cies　and　strategies　between　the　two　firms．　Toshiba　maintained　a　consistent　strategy　that　was　found－
ed　on　group　management，且rst　in‘‘selecting　and　focusing”and　subsequently　through“manage－
ment　based　on　two　core　business　groups．”Hitachi，　on　the　other　hand，　pursued　on　alternate　form　of
‘‘唐?撃?モ狽奄獅〟@and　focusing”that　centered　on‘‘conglomerate　premium．”The　resulting　data　on　invest－
ment　and　performance　by　segment　support　the丘ndings　of　the　study．
　　Previous　research　suggests　that　Japanese　corporations　need　to　free　themselves　from‘‘investment
restraint　mechanisms，”which　have　been　widespread　since　the　bursting　of　the　bubble　economy．
Although　it　is　generally　and　quantitatively　true　that　investment　restraint　has　been　a　widespread
practice　in　such　corporations，　this　article　proposes　an　additional　consideration　that　can　be　derived
from　the　cases　studied．　Undoubtedly　both　Toshiba　and　Hitachi　generally　restrained　investment
during　the　1990s　and　2000s．　However，　Toshiba’s　case　indicates　that　a　corporation　can　successfully
concentrate　its　constrained　investment　through　a　strict‘‘selecting　and　focusing”strategy　of　top－
dow耳revival，　a　necessity　that　arose　due　to　a　lack　of　available　sources　of　funds　to　support　the　entire
business　holdings　during　the　Lost　Decades．　Hitachi，　on　the　other　hand，　aims　to　achieve　conglomer－
ate　premium，戸y　concentrating　on　its　technological　strength　and　through　a　bottom－up　revival；
although　not　yet　realized，　and　there　is　still　some　uncertainty　as　to　whether　this　will　lead　to　the
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desired　outcome，　it　provides　an　alternative　means　of　coping　with　an　environment　of　investment　con一
　　　．stralnt．
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